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APPELLATE JUDICIAL ISSUES 
CASE ALLOCATION AND THE RULE 
OF LAW 
Petra Butler* 
Sir Ivor Richardson has been the Counsellor and a supporter of the New Zealand 
Association of Comparative Law since its inaugaration.  He has shown his keen interest in 
comparative law in many debates during seminars held by the Association.  It, therefore, 
seems to be opportune to introduce the session on Appellate Judicial Issues by giving an 
overview of the role of the Judge in another legal system.  Which other legal system would 
be more appropriate for me than to choose the German one!  However, there is, besides my 
personal reason for choosing the German legal system, also a real legal one.   
I INTRODUCTION 
The real force of the law, the extent of justice, and the freedom that the German 
Constitution (Grundgesetz- "GG") guarantees, can only be guaranteed by an independent 
judiciary.1  Human rights as stipulated in articles 1 to 20 of the Grundgesetz are the 
objective value system to which Germany adheres and which applies to all areas of the 
law.2  Court organisation, the jurisdiction of the courts, and the function of the Judge are 
important areas, which demanded attention in the Grundgesetz, by the Constitutional 
Court and commentators since they are instrumental to fulfil the Grundgesetz's 
constitutional idea that human beings have their own value and that freedom and equality 
are basic values of state unity.3  Part IX (articles 92-104) of the Grundgesetz deals with the 
administration of justice by the judiciary.  When drafting the Grundgesetz the drafters 
were aware that the best guarantee for a State that adheres to the rule of law and human 
  
*  Lecturer in Law, Victoria University of Wellington. 
1  See BT Dr VI/3080, 51. 
2  See BVerfGE 7, 175 (189); BVerfGE 2, 1 (12). 
3  BVerfGE 2, 1 (12). 
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rights would be a strong third force - a strong judiciary.4  The Grundgesetz provides for 
not only the organisation (article 94) and the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court 
(article 93), but also states the general, and on first sight, quite obvious "fact" that Judges 
are administering the judicial power (article 92). Especially interesting, however, in light of 
this session of the Conference, are articles 97 and 101 I 2. 
Article 97 I GG states: 
Judges are independent and only answerable to the law. 
This article seems to state the obvious and does not seem to indicate any differences in 
either the position or the tasks of Judges in New Zealand and Germany. 
However, article 101 I 2 GG which states:5 
[n]one shall be deprived of his/her lawful Judge, 
might put a different slant on article 97- the phrase "lawful Judge" will be quite unfamiliar 
to the New Zealand audience.   
Most would agree that the qualities of an independent judiciary are that it is not under 
some sort of political pressure, that its Judges are not related to the parties in front of 
them6 - in other words that its Judges are impartial.  Independence also means a 
reasonable salary and no dependence of any form to the executive or legislature.7  
However, does an independent Judge need to be someone who has been "arbitrarily" 
allocated to a case?  "Arbitrarily" in this situation means that there is a system in place that 
allocates each individual case to a Judge in accordance with criteria, which have been 
specified in advance.  This is what article 101 I 2 GG is about.  It requires the courts to 
develop criteria that automatically allocate a claim to a Judge when it arrives at the court's 
doorstep.  In other words: in Germany one has been allocated the Judge before committing 
the crime, before the proceedings have been launched.  The system has to ensure that 
Judges cannot be allocated ad hoc and ad personam.8   
  
4  Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu in Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Franz Klein, and Mitarveit von Hons 
Bernhard Brockmeyer (eds) Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (9 ed, Luchterhand, Neuwied, 1999) 1409. 
5 A similar guarantee was already to be found in the French Constitution of 1791 and most German 
State Constitutions in the nineteenth century. 
6  Controversial, however, might be whether they can be related to the legal representative of the 
parties. 
7  For example, for courts to have their own budget independent from the Ministry of Justice.  
8  BVerfGE 82, 159 (194). 
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Before I give a description of the constitutional justification for this article, I will briefly 
explain how this "lawful Judge" is determined and outline a couple of pertinent decisions. 
II DETERMINATION OF THE "LAWFUL JUDGE" 
The "lawful Judge" is partly determined by the various procedural codes (civil, 
criminal, administrative), which decide upon broad jurisdictional issues.  For example, § 25 
ZPO (Civil Procedure Code) states that the jurisdiction for immovable property lies with 
the court where the immovable is located; § 9 StPO (Criminal Procedure Code) provides 
that jurisdiction lies with a court where the accused has been apprehended.  The Judicature 
Act (GVG) provides which is the appropriate level of court (ie district or high court9).   
§§ 21-21i GVG are for the purpose of this paper of special interest.  This part of the 
GVG requires every court to form a "Präsidium" which is the court's management group.  
It consists of the president of the court as chairperson and a certain number of elected 
Judges (the number depends on the overall number of Judges at the court).  According to § 
21e GVG it is the task of the Präsidium to develop the management plan 
(Geschäftsverteilungsplan) for the court for the financial year ahead.  This management 
plan states the criteria according to which cases are allocated to Judges.  The Federal 
Constitutional Court has decided that the management plans have to be so detailed that 
the possibility of manipulating the allocation of cases is excluded.  They should exclude the 
possibility that Judges are chosen according to subjective criteria rather than general 
objective criteria.10  The Constitutional Court has held that even the mere possibility of 
manipulation infringed article 101 I 2 GG.11  However, this strict view of article 101 I 2 GG 
has been criticised by academics and practitioners who suggest that the correct test is that 
the opportunity to manipulate has actually been taken advantage of.12   
The management plan can be accessed through the court's registry.  A typical 
management plan for the year 2002 is the one of the Landgericht (High Court) in 
Braunschweig (a city comparable in size with the greater Wellington area).  The High 
Court deals with serious criminal matters (murder, rape, white collar crimes), civil matters 
  
9  See, for example, Judicature Act (GVG), § 23. 
10  BFH (Bundesfinanzhof) (21.02.1964) in NJW 1964, 1591; Adolf Arndt Die Gesetzlichkeit des Richters 
DRIZ (1959) 171.  Subjective criteria would be, for example, the party political affiliation of a 
Judge or his/her age.  Individual judicial expertise in a particular field is not necessarily a 
subjective criteria, if the criterion is used in a general way.  For example, all cases involving 
medical misadventure will be allocated to Judge X would pass muster.   
11  BVerfGE (24.03.1964) in DRIZ (1964) 175. 
12  Compare: Hans Bohlmann, Der"gesetzliche Richter" in der Praxis DRIZ (1965) 149; BFH (21.02.1964) 
in NJW 1964, 1591(1592). 
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with a case value above DM 10.000 and appeals from the District Court.  The Landgericht 
Braunschweig has 55 judges available to it. The Präsidium decided to form 12 chambers 
(comprised of three Judges) for civil trials and 11 chambers (also comprising three judges) 
for criminal trials.  It then decided in regard to civil matters to allocate certain subject areas 
to certain chambers.  If a civil matter does not fall into one of the subject areas then it will 
be allocated to the next free chamber, which is determined by a points system.  In regard to 
criminal matters, the chambers are all allocated a certain district.  The plan also deals, for 
example, with substitution during illness and holidays, and who is responsible in a case of 
a retrial.13  The management plan is twenty-four pages long and is renewed every year to 
take account, for example, of shifting workloads or retirements. These management plans 
are driven by the requirement of article 101 I 2 GG that everyone has a right to his/her 
lawful Judge.  This gives the management plan a different focus than management plans 
which are driven by monetary viability, the efficient use of its staff, or fair workload 
distribution. 
III DECISIONS 
Questions about the compatibility of court management decisions with article 101 I 2 
GG frequently come before the Constitutional Court14.  In BVerfGE 4, 412, O was 
convicted of being an accomplice to fraud by the Munich High Court and sentenced to one 
year in prison and a fine of DM 10,000.  On appeal, the Supreme Court 
(Bundesgerichtshof) quashed the sentence and ordered a retrial.  At the end of the new 
trial O was again convicted and sentenced to one year in prison.  With his new appeal O 
alleged that he was not tried by his lawful Judge.  The trial date had been set by Dr L who 
had no authority to do so because he was not a member of the responsible chamber.  Due 
to the timing of the trial, the Judges Dr R and O had not taken part in the decision even 
though they were members of the responsible chamber but at the trial date on holiday or 
otherwise prevented from taking part.  The Constitutional Court held that the 
constitutional complaint had merits.  It held that the ambit of article 101 I 2 GG not only 
encompassed the Judges presiding over a trial, but also the Judges who administer 
decisions preparing the decision, for example, the decision as to the trial date if that had an 
impact on the composition of the court.15 
  
13  Generally, retrials are decided by a different chamber at the same court. 
14  The Constitutional Court has two senates.  It divides cases between the two senates according to 
subject matter.   
15  BVerfGE 4, 412 (417 et seq). 
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In another decision,16 the complaint arose from a jurisdictional dispute between a 
number of district courts.  The first District Court where the claim was originally lodged 
had declined jurisdiction and referred the proceedings by accident (without checking the 
jurisdiction) to another District Court that also - objectively - had no jurisdiction.  The 
District Court which would have had jurisdiction declined jurisdiction with the argument 
that the referral was binding on the second District Court according to the Civil Procedure 
Code.  The High Court upheld that decision.  The Constitutional Court held that the 
claimant had been deprived of her lawful Judge.  The second District Court had been 
arbitrarily chosen since the mistake was not due to some error in the law but due to a 
geographical error. 
An interesting case is BVerfGE 40, 356.  In this case, the second senate of the 
Constitutional Court had to decide whether one of its Judges was eligible to sit on a case- 
whether he was the lawful Judge in the particular case.  The key question was whether the 
Vice President of the Constitutional Court at the time, Dr Zeidler, had been unlawfully 
elected for his second term.  The decision highlights the awareness of the courts as to how 
important it is for the confidence of the public to have their "lawful Judge" when in court 
and also the Court's17 willingness to examine its own conduct. 
To show that the Constitutional Court is not immune from scrutiny and criticism a 
debate evolved around the election of two new Constitutional Court Judges in 1996.  The 
Constitutional Court Act states that after the Judges' term of office of 12 years they conduct 
business until their successor is elected.18  The idea is to ensure that the Constitutional 
Court can work even if the election cannot be conducted in time.  At the end of 1995, the 
second senate of the Constitutional Court asked the Bundesrat (Federal Council), which is 
responsible for the election of the Constitutional Court Judges, to postpone the election of 
two new Judges for a couple of months until 1996 to give the senate the chance to finish a 
number of complicated cases in regard to the right to asylum.  The election was delayed 
and the decisions rendered in May 1996.  This action has been criticised as an infringement 
of article 101 I 2 GG.19 
  
16  BVerfGE 29, 45. 
17  In this case the second senate decided that Dr Zeidler's election to Vice President of the 
Constitutional Court was lawful.  Dr Zeidler did not take part in the decision. 
18  The Constitutional Court Act, BVerfGG, § 4 I, IV. 
19  For the debate see: Bernd Rüthers "Nicht wiederholbar!" (1996) NJW 1867; Bernd Sangmeister 
"Manipulierte Richterbank des Bundesverfassungsgerichts in den Asylverfahren?" (1996) NJW 
2561. 
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IV CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 
What are the underlying constitutional principles?  Article 101 I 2 GG is a specific 
principle deriving from the rule of law and the equality principle.  Historically, the right to 
a lawful Judge was to prevent any influence from the outside especially from the 
executive.20  Nowadays, it is also seen as a safeguard against deprivation of the lawful 
Judge through measures within the court administration.21  Article 101 I 2 GG, therefore, 
not only guarantees the subjective right of the citizen to his or her lawful Judge but it also 
prohibits other State authorities from taking away his or her lawful Judge from the citizen.  
In addition, it obliges the legislature to legislate the jurisdiction of a Judge, as clearly as 
possible.22  The principle of the rule of law commands, inter alia, that the legislature is 
bound by the constitution and that legal protection is guaranteed.  Article 101 I 2 GG is a 
specific form of the rule of law complementing the duty to provide legal protection for all 
which would be meaningless if case allocation could be manipulated.  Article 101 I 2 GG 
also emphasises the need for the legislature to implement as clearly as possible rules by 
which the lawful Judge is determined. 
Article 3 GG guarantees equality before the law.  Through article 101 I 2 GG, equality is 
achieved in respect of the citizen's access and treatment by the judiciary.  To ensure that 
nobody gets a more favourable treatment by the judicial system and everybody has the 
same chance when dealing with the judiciary an objective allocation system has to 
operate.23  Otherwise the danger exists that people receive a different treatment from the 
judiciary without any justification. 
V CONCLUSION 
The practical translation of article 101 I 2 GG plays a considerable part in establishing 
the trust of the people in an independent judiciary.  Only if a citizen can trust that the case 
allocation takes place without any regard to his or her case can the citizen be assured of 
being judged by an independent judiciary.  
To compare the New Zealand case allocation system with the German one would go 
beyond the scope of an introduction and will be the topic of another publication.  At this 
point, I think, it suffices to say that in Germany, the President of a court has not only a 
  
20  BVerfGE 6, 45 (50); 22, 49 (73). 
21  BVerfGE 82, 286 (298). 
22  BVerfGE 40, 356 (360, 361). 
23  Theodor Maunz in Theodor Maunz and Günter Dürig (eds) Grundgesetz Kommentar, Band IV- 
Artikel 91a-146 (Beck, München 1971) Article 101–114; Adolf Arndt Die Gesetzlichkeit des Richters 
DRIZ (1959) 171 (172). 
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leadership role but also oversees an important constitutional function by presiding over 
the court's management group which develops the management plan.  The idea of the 
necessity of management plans because of constitutional requirements, that is compliance 
with the rule of law, and not because of resource and financial management requirements 
is probably a rather unusual one in New Zealand.  However, I think it is worthwhile to 
discuss. 
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